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Introduction
Over the last ten years Prevent/Resilience strategies
related to countering extremism and reducing the
number of people vulnerable to being drawn towards
extremist causes linked to terrorism have been
subject of criticism. The two main criticisms centre
on defining extremism and the role of the police. By
focusing on violent extremism linked to extreme
Islamist ideology, the strategies have created a ‘them
and us’ division in society with Muslim communities
becoming a suspect community. Linked to
countering violent extremism, Prevent strategies are
perceived as another layer of intelligence gathering
where rather than being seen as involved in
community policing initiatives, Prevent officers are
seen as spies passing on intelligence to their
colleagues in counter-terrorism units. This has not
only resulted in Prevent strategies struggling to
achieve their aims, they have created divisiveness
within society.
While this article’s main focus is on the UK’s Prevent strategy, it includes a comparative
study with other states Prevent/Resilience strategies looking at the rationale behind their
creation and the problems that emanated since their introduction. With Prevent/Resilience
strategies focusing on violent extremism related to extreme Islamic ideology, this study
examines how in using the terms radicalisation and alienation the divisiveness between
Muslims and the rest of society developed. As the UK is the first Western state to place
strands of their Prevent strategy on a statutory footing, these suspicions nor the divisiveness
has diminished. Imposing a statutory responsibility on public authorities to prevent people
from being drawn into terrorism has created anxiety among staff in those authorities,
especially in the education sector. This has resulted in the creation of pressure groups
opposed to carrying out this role. With the UK government proposing to introduce a
Counter-Extremism Bill, this article argues it is imperative the Bill provides legal certainty.
In relation to a statutory definition of extremism that will underpin the provisions contained
in the Bill and guide action to be taken by the appropriate authorities, it needs to be related
to all forms of non-violent extremism. In addition to this, it is also imperative that the
accusation of Prevent police officers being an extension of counter-terrorism investigations
by passing on intelligence is dispelled. In doing so it is recommended there is greater
openness and transparency of Prevent officers’ role in the community and examples of how
they deal with all forms of extremism are released, not just those linked to extremist Islamist
terror groups.
The Introduction of Prevent/Resilience Strategies 2005-2008
The Madrid bombing and the killing of the Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gough in 2004, along
with the London bombing in 2005 were watershed moments for a number of European
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states in evaluating their counter-terrorism policies. Prevent strategies, aimed at deterring
the vulnerable being drawn into terrorism became a much stronger element to tackle the
‘home grown’ terrorist. Along with the UK, the Netherlands, Denmark and Norway
introduced a comprehensive national strategy to prevent the radicalisation of those more
vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism, with other European states developing a less
comprehensive programme led at local level. The example of local level led strategy in
Germany where Berlin authorities adopted an institutionalised format and created the Islam
Forum Berlin was also considered by other states. Following the 2003 Bali bombing by Al
Qaeda resulting in the deaths of many Australians, the Australian government developed its
Resilience strategy.
Resilience was designed to prevent the growth of home grown terrorism by introducing
programmes and activities focusing on social harmony, the promotion of Australian
democratic values and the integration of ‘suspect’ communities into broader Australian
society. Examining the best approach in the adoption of prevent strategies, the European
Union (EU) recognised the diverse approaches to the integration of Muslim communities
could be problematic in introducing a uniform policy to be introduced in all of its Member
States. This diversity ranged from the UK embracing multiculturalism, Germany and Spain
doing little to integrate their Muslim communities, to France eschewing multiculturalism
and offering citizenship to Muslims only if they embraced the French language and French
norms. As a result, in 2005 the EU Commission issued a document to be considered by its
Member States in formulating their prevent style strategies. The document is explicit that
extremism is not just religious extremism:
‘The ideologies and propaganda have varied and included extremism of different
types – whether from the extreme left or right, anarchist and religious or in many
cases nationalist. All of these groups have tried to terrorise democratic states to
concede political transformations by non-democratic means. …The Commission
believes that there is no such thing as “Islamic terrorism”, nor “catholic” nor “red”
terrorism. None of the religions or democratic political choices of European citizens
tolerates, let alone justifies, terrorism. The fact that some individuals
unscrupulously attempt to justify their crimes in the name of a religion or an
ideology cannot be allowed in any way and to any extent whatsoever to cast a
shadow upon such a religion or ideology.’ [my emphasis]
As Member States introduced prevent strategies focused solely on violent extremism linked
to Islam, the EU’s wide definition of extremism appears to have gotten lost. Having such a
narrow focus not only alienated Muslim communities, these strategies resulted in many
Muslims joining or being inspired by Islamist groups’ narrative.
Radicalised, Alienated or Marginalised towards Violent Extremism: It’s a
Muslim Thing
Introduced within years of the Madrid and London bombings, and the Al Qaeda attacks on
the US in 2001 (9/11) could explain why the early prevent strategies ignored other forms of
extremism and focused solely on Islamist extremism. The US’ response to 9/11 was to declare
a war on terror.
As a result, this phrase constructed in the public imagination a cultural clash between the
progressive West and culturally resistant Islam. It was not just in the public imagination, this
concept was also present in government departments responsible for drafting early Prevent
blueprints. This is evidenced by the many initial prevent strategies which effectivly singled
out Muslim communities as being vulnerable to radicalisation and susceptible to isolation
and marginalisation. By implicitly focusing on reforming the values and attitudes of British
Muslims, the UK’s 2008 Prevent strategy alienated many Muslims who objected to the
stigmatising effects of this focus. They saw Prevent demonising them and holding all
Muslims responsible for terrorism. This was evident in the well-meaning, but misguided
strategic document issued by the UK’s Department for Communities and Local Government
on preventing violent extremism where the aim was to win ‘hearts and minds’. The problem
came in the priorities the document set in broadening the provision of citizenship education
in supplementary schools and madrassahs and, as violent extremists exploit a lack of
understanding of Islam, in promoting faith understanding in the education system. As the
Muslim community was singled out creating a distinct other in society, this 2007 strategy did
not conclusively treat the problem of detachment of state from non-state. In stating that the
principal threat the UK faced came from radicalised individuals using a distorted and
unrepresentative interpretation of Islam to justify violence, the 2006 UK Government’s
strategy document on countering international terrorism focuses solely on Islam and the role
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of Muslim communities in the UK. This approach is not unique to the UK, it is evident in
many states’ prevent documentation.
The US’ 2003 strategy for combating terrorism has a goal of diminishing conditions
terrorists seek to exploit. It recognised factors such as poverty, deprivation, social
disenfranchisement and unresolved political disputes that can result in individuals being
vulnerable to radicalisation. The US did not look internally at combating this threat, rather it
looked externally stating it can diminish these factors through its foreign policy such as the
US-Middle East partnerships. Another example is the Dutch 2007 action plan on preventing
people at risk of slipping away from Dutch society and democratic legal order. The plan’s
main focus is on young Dutch Muslims concerned about their identity as they look for
guidance on what it is to be a Muslim in today’s world. It appears the shock of the
devastation of the 9/11, Madrid and London attacks where, without warning, 3,221 civilians
were killed by extreme Islamist groups resulted in the initial prevent strategies focusing
solely on the Islamist terror threat. Even though states like the UK and Spain had a wealth of
experience in countering terrorism during protracted terrorist campaigns with the
Provisional IRA and ETA respectively, a concern was that the operational methods chosen by
Islamist groups like Al Qaeda was new and unfamiliar ground. This required a radical change
in the strategy used for countering terrorist groups.
Not all Radicals are Terrorists
Linking radicalisation to terrorists’ violent extremism is a 21st century connection. During
the 1968-1997 Irish Troubles the UK sustained violent terrorist activity carried out by loyalist
and republican groups. This included attacks on hard and soft targets ranging from bombing
10 Downing Street, to bombing British military and civilians on both sides of the Irish Sea. In
official government documents and academic literature covering the Irish Troubles there is
hardly any a reference to radicalisation processes adopted by either republican or loyalist
groups to recruit people to their cause. Linking radicalisation directly to violent extremism
widens the parameters of activity associated with terrorism. Support of a causal connection
can be seen by the UK’s early definition of radicalisation which is:
‘… a process whereby certain experiences and events in a person’s life cause them to
become radicalised, to the extent of turning to violence to resolve perceived
grievances, are critical to understanding how terrorist groups recruit new members
and sustain support for their activities.’
It is questionable if the term radicalisation is appropriate in these circumstances. Edwards in
his Studies in Conflict and Terrorism sees the above definition as incoherent, as to be
radicalised is to undergo a kind of influence to the point of turning to violence, adding that
many people holding radical views are not involved in terrorism.
Another problem in associating radicalisation with violent extremism is in assessing who has
been radicalised to terrorist causes. Does it only include those who engage in violent
extremism or does it also include those who support violent extremism or understand why
people become violent, or even those who disapprove of violence but have sympathy with
various groups’ causes or feel these groups have legitimate grievances. While these may be
radical thoughts, it would be dangerous legal ground to assume that those who have
sympathy for or feel that certain groups have legitimate grievances are violent extremists.
Edwards study shows the majority of those who hold radical views are not involved in
terrorism. Supporting this point a Demos Report recommended that governments should
distinguish between radicalisation that leads to violence to that which does not. It states it is
possible for people to read radical texts opposed to Western foreign policy or support the
principle of Islamist groups fighting in conflict zones in the Middle East while being vocal in
denouncing Islamist inspired terrorism in Western countries. The Report adds that provided
their message does not involve intolerance or a threat to the democratic order, such
individuals can become important allies if it leads to them becoming engaged in political and
community activity. As Anthony Richards’ research found in the International Affairs
Journal, such radicals have come into contact with individuals contemplating violent acts
and successfully dissuaded them.
Preventing the Vulnerable From Being Alienated
In identifying those who are vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism, early prevent
strategies looked to address structural problems with a firm emphasis on tackling
disadvantage and inequalities, improving the educational performance, employment
prospects and housing conditions of Muslims. This is to help prevent individuals from being
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alienated. An alienated individual is one isolated from the machinations of civil society and
can become subject to an extremist view whereby both the individual and the wider social
structure come to see each other as a threat. This process of alienation is compounded when
the individual has an inability to interact with the social sphere thereby seeing themselves as
an ‘island’, separated from his/her peers, unattached to them, having few bonds or ties of any
enduring nature. As a result, alienated individuals are more likely to engage with radical
groups when they perceive themselves to be isolated from and not represented by social
constructs of the broader community. To counter this, prevent strategies promoted greater
integration to deradicalise extremist religious groups.
Accepting that alienation theory is credible, a mistake that can lead to further problems with
any strategy is applying a one-cap-fits-all approach. It is important to distinguish extremist
religio-political groups from orthodox religious groups who choose to separate themselves
from wider society. In trying to sustain a way of life for its members, some orthodox groups
may appear to have gone through the process of alienation as they separate themselves from
mainstream society. In such circumstances Maleiha Malik writing in the International
Review warns that: ‘
A liberal democracy … has to respect the rights of individuals who choose to isolate
themselves from mainstream society, but who respect the limits of law.’
If liberal democracies deny isolated but law-abiding religious groups their way of life, rather
than starting out with any political goals or interest in joining the liberal public sphere, then
will they become politically active posing an extremist threat? Strategies that ignore all forms
of extremism and focuses just on the open element of extremism creates ‘the other’ to be
treated with suspicion, and, a damaging them and us division in society. These approaches
are not new. It occurred in the UK where, following the 1974 Birmingham bombing by the
Provisional IRA the Prevention of Terrorism Act was introduced resulting in a divisiveness in
British society as Irish Catholics and British born Catholics of Irish descent were treated as a
suspect community.
The Divisiveness of Early Prevent/Resilience Strategies Related to Violent
Extremism: The Example of the UK
Gallis et al’s study into integration policies in Europe identified that government policies can
have the opposite impact on what they are trying to achieve by actually contributing to
alienation. Being mainly implicitly, but sometimes explicitly focused on reforming the values
and attitudes of British Muslims as a whole, early UK prevent strategies alienated many
Muslims who objected to the stigmatisation. This is seen in Arun Kundnani’s 2009 empirical
study for the Institute of Race Relations on the UK’s Prevent strategy. It containing scathing
responses revealing the Muslim community’s rejection of Prevent and how divisive it was.
The study reveals that members of mosques which took advantage of Prevent money to
resource their libraries, no longer got involved with that mosque. More disturbing is the
response by younger Muslims to Prevent. A voluntary sector manager said his organisation
became opposed to dealing with Prevent as the young people it dealt with were not ‘buying’
into Muslims working against Muslims, with the worker saying:
‘This will only lead to more extremism. [Prevent] has created mistrust and
organisations like ours are consequently devalued. Our organisation is now under
scrutiny because we are opposed to getting involved with the Prevent agenda’.
A manager of a youth project that worked with Prevent said among young Muslims there is a
stigma attached to those who accept Prevent funding, seeing it as ‘dirty money’.
By focusing on violent extremism linked to Islamist causes not only did early Prevent
strategies alienate Muslim communities, it also created problems regarding the perception of
the police’s role in Prevent. The main concern over the policing of Prevent centres on
allegations that it is another method open to the police for intelligence gathering. Kundnani’s
Report claims Prevent projects were being used to ‘trawl for intelligence’ with intelligence
analysts in place to carry this out. The elaborate mapping of Muslim communities as a major
Prevent objective in fostering close relations between counter-terrorism policing and non-
policing local providers facilitated information not just on individuals whose opinions are
considered as extreme, but also the local Muslim population in general.
In 2009 media reporting brought these suspicions of the police role in Prevent into the
public arena. The BBC’s Panorama programme reported intelligence gathering was being
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carried out by the police in Prevent and, in making claims that intelligence gathering was a
key component of Prevent, the UK newspaper, The Guardian, reported:
‘Serious concerns that the Prevent programme is being used at least in part to “spy”
on Muslims have been voiced not just by Islamic groups, but youth workers,
teachers and others. Some involved in the programme have told The Guardian of
their fears that they are being co-opted into spying.’
It was the police role in funding decisions and the mapping Muslim communities that
damaged and muddied perceptions about their role in Prevent. As Yahya Birt observed:
‘It has raised questions about how to preserve relationships of trust, confidentiality
and professional integrity for those working with disadvantaged communities, and
particularly with young Muslim people. … [Prevent] has raised questions of police
interference in the political relationships between local authorities and Muslim
communities’.
Although in response to the negative media reporting the police stated Prevent was a strategy
aimed at blocking radicalisation and reducing the supply of terror recruits, not a ‘Trojan
Horse’ dedicated to intelligence gathering, the damage the police’s role in Prevent was done.
The residue of this damage has not dissipated over time, it is still present with the recently
revised Prevent strategy. In 2015 a former senior Metropolitan Police senior officer claimed
that Prevent is a ‘toxic brand’ and ‘widely mistrusted’. Although this claim was denied by the
president of the National Association of Muslim Police, these suspicions remain and appear
to be deepening. It is not now simply a case for damage limitation, this accusation must be
dispelled. As the UK Government has revised Prevent, introduced a Counter- Extremism
strategy, placed a statutory obligation on agencies to report those vulnerable to being drawn
into terrorism and is proposing to introduce a Counter-Extremism Bill, it is imperative the
police role is clearly delineated if Prevent is to achieve its aims.
Current Prevent/Resilience Strategies
In 2011 the UK Government revised the Prevent strategy with three main objectives:
1. Respond to the ideological challenge of terrorism and the threat faced by those
who promote it; 2. Prevent people from being drawn into terrorism and ensure they
are given appropriate advice and support; 3. Work with sectors and institutions
where there are risks of radicalisation that need to be addressed.
Compared to the 2007 version, among the key changes in the UK’s 2011 Prevent strategy the
term ‘violent extremism’ is abandoned and replaced by non-violent extremism, which
includes all forms of extremism leading to terrorism. While the UK’s 2011 strategy looks at
the wider aspects of extremism, it appears the UK is alone among Western states with its
strategy covering non-violent extremism. For example, while there are similarities in the
developments contained in Australia’s 2015 Resilience strategy with the UK’s such as having
an emphasis on identifying and diverting at-risk individuals and government agencies and
communities working to reduce the driver of radicalisation, the position on extremism has
not changed. It states Australia’s task is to limit the spread and influence of violent extremist
ideas.
The UK’s 2011 Prevent strategy addresses the issues related to the connection between the
police and intelligence gathering. Acknowledging the police collection of information for
community mapping was confused with covert operation activity leading to allegations based
on a misunderstanding about the process for supporting vulnerable people, the 2011
document states:
‘…we emphasise that it must be a guiding principle of prevent that the programme
is not used as a means for covert spying on people or communities. We do not
believe that has been the case. It must not be. Data collected about people for the
purposes of Prevent must be necessary and proportionate.’
The 2011 Government White Paper CONTEST document reinforces this saying the
relationship between Prevent and Pursue (investigation and disruption of terrorist activity)
must be carefully managed as Prevent is not a means for spying or for other covert activity.
Placing Prevent Strategy Obligations on Statutory Footing
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The UK is the first Western state to legislate certain prevent obligations. Staff at specified
authorities now have a statutory duty to prevent people being drawn into terrorism. This is
causing great consternation to many staff members of the specified authorities listed in
Schedule 6 of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, none more so than among staff
employed in education. This has led to uncertainty as to what level of extremist behaviour or
words expressed needs to be before determining if it should be reported to their local Prevent
police team. Teachers’ fear of falling foul of section 26 has led to some referrals resulting in
sensationalist national media coverage, portraying the work carried out by Prevent police
teams in a negative light. Recent examples include a 10 year old boy from Lancashire who
wrote in school that he lived in a ‘terrorist house’, a four year old boy from Luton who
mispronounced ‘cucumber’ saying ‘cooker-bomb’ and drawing a man cutting something with
a knife, and, on Merseyside an 8 year old boy who after learning of the plight of Syrian
refugees said he wanted to fight terrorists. Negative media headlines like these and those
related to the counter-radicalisation strategy in general damages the good work carried out
by Prevent police teams and those they work with. The accelerant resulting in strident
opinions decrying Prevent has been the section 26 'General Duty' requirement that
authorities take preventative action. This has led to a general misunderstanding and
uncertainty by many staff members in the authorities as to their statutory obligation and the
primary purpose of Prevent.
As a result the education sector saw the formation of pressure groups such as ‘students not
suspects’, ‘Educators not Informants’, and ‘Education not Surveillance’. The aim of these
groups is the repeal of the section 26 requirement placed on education establishments. The
National Union of Teachers 2016 annual conference debated this issue. Seeing the statutory
obligation as shutting down open debate about topical issues, the teachers perceived Prevent
as creating suspicion and confusion. Arguing that Prevent disproportionately targets
Muslims, they subsequently voted for the strategy to be withdrawn from schools and colleges.
Underpinning these suspicions and confusion is the lack of a clear and precise legal
definition of what amounts to extremism. It is imperative that one looks beyond extremism
linked to the narrow extreme Islamist narrative, such extremist behaviour has to be inclusive
of all forms of extremism. This includes extremism related to far right organisation that in
2016 has produced terrorist violence in the UK as seen in Liverpool in February that the far
right group National Alliance calls the ‘Battle of Liverpool’ and with Thomas Mair who,
influenced by the far right narrative, murdered a Labour MP, Jo Cox in June.UK’s Counter-
Extremism Bill: Can Legislation be More Inclusive and Less Divisive? In the Queen’s Speech
2016 it was revealed that during the 2016/17 parliamentary session the UK government will
introduce a Counter-Extremism Bill. When one considers the problems and issues related to
previous Prevent strategies, the UK is taking a bold legislative move. To help prevent people
being drawn into extremism the Bill is expected to include:
1. Banning orders for extremist organisation who seek to undermine democracy or
use hate speech in public places; 2. Disruption orders to restrict people who seek to
radicalise young people; 3. Powers to close premises where extremists seek to
influence others.
What is important is that what is perceived as extremism covers a broad range of extremist
activity displayed by all in society, not just a form of activity linked to one community. To
achieve this, and as it will underpin the provisions contained in the Bill, it is important the
Bill contains a definition of non-violent extremism that provides legal certainty compliant
with the requirements of the European Convention on Human Rights. It is important a
balance is drawn between the rights of expression and thought where one can be critical of
government decisions and state actions while protecting citizens’ security. The difference
between the two is that the former narrative is simply critical, while the latter’s narrative
espouses the removal of religions, political discourse or certain groups from society. It is the
latter that forms extremist thought which can draw the vulnerable towards terrorist activity.
It is imperative that any legislative move towards countering extremism not only has legal
certainty in protecting rights, but also does not tolerate thoughts that dangerously impinge
on the rights and beliefs of others. Any legislative move designed to counter extremism must
contain all forms of extremism espoused by all groups in society. In doing so, such moves are
more likely to be inclusive, not divisive. By having such legal certainty it will guide staff in the
agencies required to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism and the courts
regarding what actions amounts to non-violent extremism.
Conclusion
It is not just the UK, but many other states that have faced criticism relating to their initial
prevent/resilience strategies. Most of that criticism emanates from the early strategies’ focus
Prevent/Resilience Strategies: Are they Inclusive or Devisive? | The NewJurist
http://newjurist.com/prevent-and-resilience-strategies.html[07/07/2016 07:13:09]
on radicalisation related to violent extremism linked to Islamist groups. The context in which
these strategies were formulated can help to explain why this approach was adopted.
Developed and introduced shortly after 9/11, 2003 Bali bombing, 2004 Madrid bombing and
the 2005 London bombing by individuals linked to Al Qaeda, one can appreciate many
nation states’ concern in preventing further indiscriminate attacks carried out by Islamist
groups. One approach to help in minimising this threat was in adopting prevent/resilience
strategies at pre-criminal level to help those susceptible to becoming radicalised.
Unfortunately those initial strategies had the adverse effect. By focusing solely on the
Islamist threat it alienated many nation states’ Muslim communities. Due to the deep
suspicion of funding provided by prevent strategies and with the agencies associated with the
strategies, none more so than the police, it resulted in a divisive society. Muslim
communities did not see the police involved in prevent strategies as community or
neighbourhood officers helping the community, rather they were perceived as spies for
counter-terrorism investigators, with prevent strategies being a vehicle for intelligence
gathering on suspect communities.
Even though later versions of prevent strategies have been developed with many aims
refocused, the residue of suspicion remains. This may be due to many states still linking
radicalisation to violent extremism. Australia’s Resilience strategy is still aimed at
challenging violent extremist ideologies. While not explicit, in the documentation it is
implicit the Australian government is challenging ideologies linked to Islamist groups. It is
possible, and understandable, the recency of the Sydney hostage siege in December 2014 by
an Islamic radical that resulted in three deaths (including the hostage taker) could help to
explain this approach. With the inquest into this siege being conducted in April 2016,
(Australian Associated Press 2016), clearly this tragic event still remains in the Australian
psyche.
By placing a responsibility on staff in certain agencies to prevent people from being drawn
into terrorism, the UK is the only Western state to legislate part of their Prevent strategy. The
residue of suspicion has led to a degree of contempt, especially among staff involved in
education. Despite it being eleven years after the EU’s recommendation, in its Counter-
Extremism 2015 strategy that the UK introduced a definition of non-violent extremism
ranging from far right to Islamist extremism, but this has not prevented the formation of
pressure groups opposed to Prevent. This could be problematic for the UK government when
it introduces its Counter-Extremism Bill. To counter those who vehemently oppose Prevent
strategies the UK government must address two key issues. Firstly, ensure there is legal
certainty in a legal definition of non-violent extremism by not containing subjective or
disputed terms and ensure it covers all forms of extremism. In doing so, in protecting rights
of expression and thought, it must be drafted in a way that ensures compatibility with the
European Convention on Human Rights.
This can be supported with a clearly written accompanying codes of practice, drafted in a
style that can be easily understood by staff working in agencies unfamiliar with criminal
justice processes. Secondly, dispel the accusation that Prevent is another method of spying
on the Muslim community. This can be achieved with Prevent officers operating with greater
transparency and accountability in the community and stressing that the Prevent officers’
role is more closely aligned to pre-criminal community policing, not the criminal
investigative pursue strand. In order to help eliminate the divisiveness in society that
currently exists, without revealing specific details of cases, data and examples of the various
forms of extremism dealt with by Prevent officers should be regularly released, especially
those not related to extreme Islamist ideology.
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